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HUMAN RIGHTS DISASTERS, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE 
STATE: AN EMERGING ECONOMY CASE 
1. Introduction 
This paper stems from a concern for corporate accountability and human rights. Since the 
adoption of the UN guiding principles on human rights, this issue has begun to be explicitly 
linked with the conceptualisation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. This was 
recognised by McPhail and McKernan (2011), who, in their editorial for a special issue of 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting on human rights accounting, described the recognition of 
abuses of human rights by businesses as a “significant development in the global discourse on 
corporate accountability” (McPhail and McKernan, 2011, p.734). Following the special issue, 
there has been some interest amongst accounting researchers in exploring corporate 
disclosures and examining human rights items reported in CSR reports. What has been 
relatively ignored in this emerging research is the responses of (both multinational and other) 
corporations and the state to human rights disasters in businesses. Thus, McPhail and 
McKernan’s (2011) observations about corporate accountability and links between human 
rights abuses and business need further empirical and theoretical development. This paper 
fills this gap. 
Previous studies have highlighted that a nexus between the state and businesses perpetuates 
human rights violations by corporations (Sikka, 2011; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). For 
instance, Sikka (2011) has explored how multinational companies constrain the state’s ability 
to protect human rights by imposing stabilisation clauses on host countries. Similarly, Lauwo 
and Otusanya (2014) have demonstrated how the Tanzanian state was unable to raise and 
address human rights issues caused potentially by multinational mining companies. This 
debate needs to be extended to the state’s role in protecting human rights, not only in 
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multinational companies but in businesses in general. Questions need to be raised about how 
the state responds in protecting the safety and security of workers, as well as safeguarding 
working conditions and the rights of workers and the wider public which are often breached 
or unrecognised by businesses (Gallhofer et al., 2011). This becomes even more important 
when the state lacks resources and political will, as is often the case in poorer countries. 
Thus, this paper investigates the state-business nexus in responses to human rights violations. 
In particular, the paper explores two important corporate human rights elements affecting 
workers in Bangladeshi readymade garments (RMG) factories: working conditions and trade 
union rights. 
RMG factories in Bangladesh have suffered a number of disasters in recent years, the latest 
being the Rana Plaza disaster, the worst industrial accident since the Bhopal disaster in India 
in 1984 (The Economist, 2013). A UN report laid the blame on the Bangladeshi government 
for its failure to address human rights disasters caused by RMG factories in Bangladesh, 
citing the state’s lack of political will, technical capacity and resources (Labowitz and 
Baumann-Pauly, 2014). The government of Bangladesh, together with the owners of RMG 
factories, were accused of “criminal negligence”, due mainly to their inability to make these 
factories accountable or to ensure basic workers’ rights (Gomes, 2013; Kernaghan, 2012). 
Serious questions have also been raised about recurring safety issues in the Bangladeshi 
RMG sector in the context of broader human rights issues pertaining to global supply chains1 
(The Economist, 2013).  
Bangladesh has ratified the UN guiding principles (UN, 2011) that make it obligatory for the 
government to uphold specific human rights in business enterprises. Unfortunately, however, 
protection of human rights does not feature in the Bangladeshi government’s list of priorities 
(DW, 2014). Like many other poorer countries, socio-political conditions in Bangladesh are 
often characterised by a lack of governance and accountability and an appalling human rights 
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record (HRW, 2014). Bitter political rivalry and distrust between the two major political 
parties (similar to a family feud) has led to the establishment of a dysfunctional democracy, 
allowing the state to become increasingly autocratic. Consequently, governments have 
engaged in harsh crackdowns on political opponents, as well as on civil society and the media 
(HRW, 2014). This has raised serious doubts about the state’s willingness and ability to meet 
its obligations to protect human rights in business. Thus, this paper explores two research 
issues: the response of the state-business nexus to human rights violations and its 
implications for the efficacy of the UN guidelines. 
The theoretical perspective of this paper draws on the work of Stanley Cohen, a sociologist 
who studied the criminal activities of states. An important part of Cohen’s (1993, 2001) work 
involves examining the discourse of official denial used by states involved in human rights 
abuses. Cohen provides a comprehensive typology of such strategies of denial. Using 
Cohen’s framework allows us to demonstrate how the state-business nexus is critical in the 
formation of a wider culture of denial in a society in which many human rights violations 
remain unacknowledged or ignored. In such a “state of denial”, effective implementation of 
the UN guiding principles on human rights in the RMG sector will be questionable. Drawing 
on Black’s (2008) work, Cohen’s typologies of denial will be further elaborated from the 
positions of the legitimacy and accountability of the state, and of non-state actors such as 
trade associations. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of 
accounting and human rights in the context of the evolution of human rights in business. The 
theoretical framework is discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 provides a description of the 
research methods. In Section 5, the political and economic conditions of Bangladesh, and the 
background of RMG and its international context are briefly presented, as well as human 
rights disasters in the RMG sector and responses of the state and business. Section 6 presents 
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theoretical iterations drawing on Cohen’s typologies of denial and Black’s (2008) work on 
legitimacy and accountability relationships, and Section 7 draws conclusions. 
2. Human Rights and Accounting Research 
The issue of human rights violations in business entities has been emerging on the 
international governance agenda for some time. During the 1970s, the UN attempted to 
establish mandatory international laws governing the activities of multinational companies. 
However, this initiative was blocked by several member states. Since then, “soft law” 
initiatives have been undertaken by multilateral agencies (e.g. OECD and ILO). Accounting 
research on human rights is also a relatively new area of study, although it appears in many 
guises in the accounting literature (Cooper et al., 2011). For instance, Gray and Gray (2011) 
suggest that reporting practices regarding employee-related issues were extant as early as the 
1940s. 
Human rights issues have taken a new turn since the formal endorsement of the guiding 
principles on human rights in businesses following John Ruggie’s (2008) “protect, respect, 
remedy” framework (UN, 2011). The emergence of UN guiding principles on human rights 
was justified mainly on the grounds of multinational companies’ (MNCs) variable responses 
to human rights and the weak bargaining power of the state, especially in poorer countries 
(Gray and Gray, 2011). The UN’s attempts to protect human rights in business through 
national legal systems and other initiatives largely failed, leading to what Ruggie describes as 
“global governance gaps and governance failures” (Whelan et al., 2009). This necessitated 
the establishment of a different kind of institutional framework within which the issue of 
business and human rights could be addressed (Gray and Gray, 2011). Emphasis on this 
alternative framework led to the development in 1999 of a UN Global Compact, requiring 
companies to align their strategies with universal principles on human rights, labour rights, 
anticorruption and other societal goals. All 12,000 signatories were required to report 
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regularly on their progress towards compliance with the compact, failing which their names 
would be removed from the list of signatories. Ruggie’s (2007) report on International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts was followed by his key 
(2008) publication, which set the basis for the UN’s guiding principles on business and 
human rights (UN, 2011). 
The first guiding principle relates to the state’s duty to protect human rights, which includes 
obligations to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate and punish businesses that abuse 
human rights. The state has a responsibility to ensure that other laws and policies governing 
the creation and ongoing operation of business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not 
constrain but enable business respect for human rights. In addition, states are required to 
provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human rights throughout 
their operations and to encourage business enterprises to communicate how they address their 
human rights impact. The guiding principles also require states to set clear expectations that 
all business enterprises operating in their territory should respect human rights throughout 
their operations. 
This new emphasis on the state’s role in protecting human rights in businesses has led the 
emerging discipline of human rights accounting research to examine the role of both 
corporations and states in safeguarding human rights (Hazelton, 2013). Some studies have 
argued that corporations are liable for their human rights performance. Gallhofer et al. (2011) 
note that, although human rights have traditionally been viewed almost exclusively as the 
state’s duty towards its citizens (Ratner, 2001), there have always been concerns regarding 
the power of businesses, especially MNCs, as non-state actors. Consequently, there have been 
calls for accounting scholars to explore the human rights obligations of MNCs (Sikka, 2011). 
Cooper et al. (2011) used an industrial disaster in Glasgow to set out the case for a radically 
different form of accounting to enable concerns regarding human rights violations to be taken 
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“seriously” (Cooper et al., 2011, p.738). Islam and McPhail (2011) have explored the extent 
to which multinational garment retailers use human rights discourses in their corporate 
responsibility disclosures. 
Some accounting research has considered access to certain information as a human right. 
From this perspective, the availability of information regarding the social and environmental 
performance of an entity is considered to be a right, based on the premise that without such 
information it would be difficult to realise other rights (Elkington, 1999). Hazelton (2013) 
explores this particular dimension to analyse corporate water-related disclosures, concluding 
that, although corporate water disclosures may not necessarily form part of sustainability 
reports, there is scope to make such disclosures through public databases and product 
labelling. This is consistent with Cooper et al.’s (2011) argument that reporting on corporate 
human rights issues may require a radically different format. 
One interesting aspect of human rights accounting research thus far is acknowledgement of 
states’ inability and/or unwillingness to stop human rights abuses, especially those committed 
by MNCs (Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Frankental, 2011). Using the case of the mining 
industry in Tanzania, Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) demonstrate how the state was unable to 
raise and address human rights issues arguably caused by multinational mining companies. 
Frankental (2011) points out that states may sometimes find it difficult to strengthen domestic 
social, environmental and human rights standards for fear of challenge by foreign investors. 
This is particularly prevalent in poorer countries, where lack of institutional capacity to 
enforce national standards makes it difficult to take action against MNCs on human rights 
violations. Similarly, Gallhofer et al. (2011) acknowledge that some states are reluctant to 
regulate corporate human rights conduct due to the cost of such actions and potential foreign 
policy repercussions. It is also argued that different states may face different demands from 
corporations. However, this debate needs to be extended to the state’s role in protecting 
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human rights, not only in MNCs but in business in general, including local corporations. It is 
also interesting to observe how the state and businesses respond to and legitimise their 
positions on human rights disasters in order to shield themselves from wider stakeholders 
such as multilateral agencies (e.g. the UN) and the public at large. 
The UN guiding principles are supposed to make governments more accountable for 
protecting human rights in businesses. Nevertheless, states’ willingness and/or ability are 
crucial. Previous studies, predominantly in the areas of law and criminology, indicate that 
many states have themselves been culpable of human rights abuses. In most cases, states have 
adopted a discourse of denial to reject accusations of human rights abuses (Cohen, 1993). If a 
state denies human rights abuses committed against its own citizens, it is difficult to see how 
it can be proactive against human rights abuses in businesses operating in its territory, raising 
serious questions about the efficacy of the UN’s (2011) guiding principles. The next section 
will elaborate on Cohen’s work from the perspective of the legitimacy and accountability of 
states and corporations. 
3. Theorising denial, legitimacy and accountability 
Although the term “denial” is relatively uncommon in the accounting and management 
literature, it is frequently used in the fields of psychiatry and criminology. The notion of 
denial originated in Freud’s work2 and was later extended to social science disciplines (Freud, 
1936; Lapanche and Pontalis, 1973; Baumeister et al., 1998). In his seminal work, Cohen 
(1993) used Freud’s typology of defensive mechanisms to investigate government responses 
to allegations of human rights violations. 
Cohen (1993, 2001) suggests that denial may be private/personal, official or cultural.3 
Cohen’s (2001) work focuses especially on the discourse of “official” denial. He argues that 
very few states disregard outside pressures regarding their atrocities. In order to appease 
various multilateral agencies, such as the UN, the World Bank and the International 
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Monetary Fund, most states actively react to cases of human rights violation in three ways: 
with classic official denial, by attacking the critic, and through partial acknowledgement of 
the action. 
There are three variants of classic official denial: literal (nothing happened), interpretive 
(what happened is really something else), and implicatory (what happened is justifiable). 
According to Cohen, “literal denial” is only possible in authoritarian and repressive regimes 
totally devoid of any public accountability, where the government’s control over the media 
makes any counter-claim impossible. “Interpretive denial” may involve governments legally 
challenging whether a particular course of action is in violation of, for example, 
internationally accepted norms on human rights. An important version of interpretive denial 
is denial of responsibility. Here, the state might actually acknowledge that something wrong 
has happened, but will apply a discourse to establish that responsibility for that action lies 
with other groups, the usual suspects being militants and vague “third forces” (Cohen, 2001, 
p.109). As part of an “implicatory denial” strategy, a government may claim that particular 
human rights violations are isolated events and do not reflect the overall condition of the 
country. Appeal to a higher moral authority is another variant of implicatory denial, which 
may also involve “condemnation of the condemners”, questioning the moral authority of the 
critics. 
The second form of active reaction is adoption of a counter-offensive strategy. Here, all 
allegations are refuted as lies, propaganda and ideological prejudice. Counter-offensive 
techniques against international bodies, for example human rights activist groups, range from 
identifying errors in reports prepared by the condemners, to questioning their source of 
financing or their political bias. Internal critics may be branded as treacherous, unpatriotic or 
irresponsible. 
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The third form of active reaction is partial acknowledgement. According to Cohen (2001), 
this strategy is adopted either as a result of a change in political regime, or when the evidence 
is too embarrassing to be able to deny it. Partial acknowledgement involves use of a discourse 
claiming that the events were either isolated or happened during a previous political regime. 
In both cases, assurances are provided that such incidents will not recur in future. 
The discourse of official denial needs to be understood in the context of the legitimacy and 
accountability relationships of the states or organisations making official denials. This will 
help explain why and how such organisations and states continue to survive or are seen to be 
legitimate, even in light of serious human rights violations. We draw on Black’s (2008) work 
on the construction of legitimacy and accountability relationships, according to which three 
elements are central to understanding the dynamics of legitimacy and accountability: the role 
of the institutional environment; the dialectical nature of accountability relationships; and the 
communicative structures through which accountability occurs and legitimacy is constructed. 
It is important to observe how the state or organisations engage with the discourse of official 
denial and maintain their legitimacy. Black (2008) observes that regulators (whether state or 
non-state actors) may attempt to create and manipulate the perceptions of wider stakeholders. 
This attempt at manipulation is a communicative activity of rendering account, which might 
have transformative effects on the organisation, but the official denial – whatever form it 
takes – is critical to its legitimacy and the continuity and scope of rendering accountability to 
wider stakeholders. Denial of responsibility deploying various denial strategies, a form of 
communicative structure, may be seen as an attempt to present narratives of past actions – a 
form of accountability. The form or shape in which accountability occurs is contingent on the 
types of legitimacy claims that state or non-state actors seek to establish. 
Black (2008) articulates three forms of legitimacy claim. First, legitimacy may be 
pragmatically based, where individuals or social groups perceive that the organisation will 
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pursue their interests directly or indirectly. Second, it may be normative/morally based: the 
individual or social group perceives the goals and/or procedures of the organisation to be 
morally appropriate. Finally, legitimacy may be cognitively based, when the organisation is 
accepted as necessary or inevitable (Black, 2008, p.144; Zucker, 1987; Suchman, 1995). In 
the case of a human rights violation in a Bangladeshi garments factory, the state or non-state 
actors’ rationale for official denial is better understood if we examine how the legitimacy of 
these organisations is constructed, and the role of accountability. Although legitimacy does 
not depend on an accountability relationship, it is argued that accountability frameworks are 
contingent on the kinds of legitimacy claims that organisations or states are motivated to 
make, which in turn are bounded by the institutional environment. For instance, cognitive 
legitimacy is so deeply rooted as inevitable that it does not undergo further assessment; 
hence, the accountability framework is often absent. This resonates with family-led states 
such as Bangladesh, where two families have an apparent birthright to power. Family 
relationships are sufficient, and no further justification is needed to exercise power (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008). Nevertheless, pragmatic and moral legitimacy claims entail further 
evaluation by stakeholders. 
Black (2008) sees accountability as one form of constructing and presenting a narrative of 
past events or actions. This narrative may well be false and may only serve its own interests. 
Accountability relationships may thus simply be strategic devices used by organisations to 
manipulate perceptions of their activities and performance in order to enhance the 
organisation’s legitimacy (Black, 2008, p.151). Official denial may be seen as a strategic 
device to enhance the legitimacy and accountability relationships of state or non-state actors. 
This will be further examined in the context of human rights violations in RMG factories in 
Bangladesh. 
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4. Research methods 
It has always been difficult to conduct human rights inquiries in politically unstable countries. 
A substantial amount of information lies behind closed doors and in confidential files, not 
easily accessible by researchers (Ashraf and Uddin, forthcoming). Many such states are 
accused of engaging in human rights abuses themselves (Cohen, 1993). Nevertheless, 
serendipitous invitations to attend a series of multi-stakeholder advisory consultation (MAC) 
meetings with key agents on human rights issues in the RMG sector provided us with the 
opportunity to begin this project. These meetings were organised jointly by a Europe-based 
human rights institute and a US-based NGO to raise awareness of the UN global compact on 
human rights.4 In addition to attending these meetings, our data collection also involved 
interviews with key agents and documentary analysis. 
Since the main focus of our study was to understand state-business responses to human rights 
disasters such as Rana Plaza, meetings with key agents were crucial. The first MAC meeting 
took place in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 12 May 2013, soon after the Rana Plaza collapse. Forty-
eight people from diverse backgrounds participated in the meeting, including RMG owners, 
representatives of trade unions and industry associations, foreign buyers, NGOs and civil 
society organisations, international government agencies, and the government of Bangladesh 
(Appendix 1, Panel A lists the organisations represented at the meeting). The main purpose of 
the meeting was to engage in a day-long discussion regarding the presence and impact of 
human rights issues in the RMG sector in Bangladesh. During the first MAC discussion, the 
groups, seated at six tables, were provided with the corporate human rights policies ratified 
by the Bangladeshi Government. These included: investment and procurement practices; non-
discrimination; freedom of association and collective bargaining; abolition of child labour; 
prevention of forced and compulsory labour; complaints and grievance practices; security 
practices (health and safety); and indigenous rights. At the end of the day-long session, each 
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group was asked to rank the human rights priorities for the RMG sector. Appendix 2 presents 
the human rights priorities identified by each group of diverse participants. 
Two sets of human rights policies were identified as top priorities by the participants: the 
presence of collective bargaining agents (trade unions); and working conditions, including 
forced and compulsory labour, complaints and grievance procedures, and occupational health 
and safety. These two human rights issues were explored further at a second MAC meeting 
held in Dhaka on 5 March 2014. This time, 42 participants from Bangladeshi businesses, 
government agencies, trade unions and civil society organisations came together to identify 
concrete actions relating to the two high-priority human rights issues. Whereas the 
participants in the first MAC meeting were mostly field-level managers and mid-level 
executives, those representing the various organisations at the second MAC meeting were 
senior policy makers (Appendix 1, Panel B lists the participants). Pseudo-names have been 
used for the RMG owners participating in the meeting, at their request. As for the second 
meeting, participants were again seated at six tables. One of the authors was actively involved 
in facilitating dialogues at different tables, and all tables allowed their dialogues to be 
recorded with a digital tape recorder. The first author was also engaged in formal and 
informal discussions with the participants between the sessions. Given the sensitivity of 
human rights issues, such access to important stakeholders in the RMG sector is unique, and 
was a rich source of information for this study. 
Comments made in group discussions during the MAC meetings were supplemented by 
follow-up interviews. Eleven interviews were conducted with key participants in the second 
MAC meeting. These interviewees included representatives of labour unions and employers, 
council members of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturing and Exporters Association 
(BGMEA) and Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA), 
policy makers, and human rights activists (Appendix, Panel B indicates participants who 
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were interviewed). These interviews lasted for about 20 to 30 minutes, and were conducted 
mainly to clarify issues raised during the MAC meetings and/or to elicit additional comments 
on the subject. Subsequent to the meetings and interviews, the first draft of this paper was 
circulated to the participants and organisers of the MAC meetings, as a result of which the 
authors were asked to remove some observations and quotations on issues such as use of 
child labour and gender discrimination that were considered to be too sensitive. 
Citation of observations and interviews in the paper is based on the principle of theoretical 
sampling (Mason, 2002). According to this principle, we chose interviews and commentaries 
from key agents which provide theoretical insights. In line with our theoretical aims, we were 
interested in understanding responses to two human rights issues with which the RMG sector 
has been grappling since the Rana Plaza disaster. In addition to the formal interviews, we also 
had opportunities for informal discussions during meetings with participants. These formal 
interviews and informal discussions helped us to understand the participants’ thinking, 
attitudes and constraints, and were corroborated and complemented by reports prepared by 
national and international agencies, newspapers and TV channels. The Rana Plaza incident 
received considerable coverage in both international and national print and electronic media 
in Bangladesh. Search engines provided important links to relevant news reports covered by 
international media agencies such as CNN, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Reuters, Huffington Post 
and The Guardian. Newspaper search engines for local media also provided key information 
regarding human rights issues pertaining to the RMG sector. Another important source of 
information on human rights issues in Bangladesh was institutional reports produced by 
national and international human rights and civil society organisations, such as Transparency 
International (TI) and its Bangladesh chapter, Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and Freedom 
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House. We also reviewed historical political-economic literature to understand the 
institutional context of the state and the RMG sector. 
The next stage was analysis of the field data collected from the three sources: MAC meetings, 
interviews and documentary evidence. Two strands of analysis led firstly to uncovering 
institutional conditions, and secondly to understanding the strategic responses of the state and 
businesses. Drawing on Black (2008), we sought to understand institutional conditions 
affecting the state, the RMG sector nationally and internationally, and human rights disasters. 
This was useful to gain an understanding of the state’s position on denials of human rights 
abuses in general and in the RMG sector in particular. We focused our analysis on the 
narratives of the state and trade associations such as BGMEA in relation to human rights 
disasters. Various forms of denial, legitimacy claims and accountability forms were identified 
in these narratives. The results of our analysis are presented below. 
5. Institutional field: Bangladesh, RMG and human rights 
Bangladesh is a densely populated country in South Asia. In recent years, the country has 
made significant strides towards economic development, propelled by the strong performance 
of its RMG industry, and remittances sent by expatriate Bangladeshis. Nevertheless, the 
country has a fragile democracy. A dysfunctional political system, family politics and a lack 
of transparency and accountability are often identified as the greatest threats to Bangladesh’s 
economic development (Knox, 2009). In 2013, a survey conducted by TIB revealed that 
politicians, police and judiciary were perceived to be the most corrupt sectors in the country 
(The Daily Star, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the country has a poor record on human rights. 
According to HRW, the human rights situation in Bangladesh has worsened further as the 
government has narrowed the political and civil society space, shielded abusive security 
forces from accountability, and ignored calls to reform laws and procedures for trials of war 
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crimes and mutinies (HRW, 2013). In 2014, Bangladesh ranked 115th out of 167 countries in 
terms of press freedom (Freedom House, 2014). 
The political climate in Bangladesh has further contributed to the worsening of human rights 
conditions. Apart from a period of military rule between 1983 and 1990, two family-led 
political parties have controlled state power since Bangladeshi independence in 1971. The 
founders of both parties are linked with the Bangladeshi war of independence and claim to 
have played major roles in leading the war. These war hero claims have contributed to 
creating cognitive legitimacy amongst their supporters for ruling the country. Sons and 
daughters are the legitimate heirs to political party leadership. Both political parties are now 
led by family members of the founders and claim to have majority support in the country. 
Losing elections is unacceptable, and the other party is often blamed for electoral 
malpractice. This has led to political violence, personification of state bodies, capture of the 
judicial process and the creation of a support base in the civil service and military. Only 
family members and wealthy supporters of the families can be nominated and elected to 
public office. Unsurprisingly, business owners side strategically with the political families 
(Zaman, 2011). As a consequence, a new generation of Bangladeshi businessmen-politicians 
has emerged: 57 per cent of current members of parliament are businessmen (The Daily Star, 
2011). Political patronage has become almost a necessary condition for operating a successful 
business. This has even affected the leadership contests of trade associations, which are 
publicly associated with the two political parties. Black (2008) argues that bodies may link 
themselves to other institutions to develop moral and cognitive legitimacy. Alignment with 
the ruling party is perhaps driven by such ambitions. Thus, the state depends on businesses, 
not only because of economic incentives such as investment and employment (Gallhofer et 
al., 2011), but also because of businessmen’s influence over state politics (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). 
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The above political and economic conditions in Bangladesh set the legitimacy and 
accountability context for human rights abuses in the RMG sector. This also needs to be 
understood in the context of key players on the international scene. From a modest beginning 
in 1985, the country has now emerged as the second largest global exporter of garment 
products, due mainly to the availability of cheap labour in the country. Bangladeshi textile 
employees are amongst the lowest paid in the world, making the country a lucrative 
outsourcing destination for many large, global manufacturers of RMG. One essential attribute 
of the Bangladeshi RMG industry is its reliance on a system of “indirect sourcing”, also 
referred to as the “hub and spoke” model (Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2014), under which 
orders received by a manufacturer from a buyer are subcontracted to numerous other 
factories. This model has two implications. Firstly, the subcontracting chain leads to the 
margin received by each manufacturer becoming incrementally smaller. This creates further 
pressure to lower the cost of production, which undermines wages and working conditions, 
investments in technology and training, and improvements in productivity and quality 
(Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2014). Secondly, a supply chain consisting of a series of sub-
contractors is very difficult to monitor, by either government or buyers. The Rana Plaza 
collapse does not seem to have had any impact on the popularity of the “hub and spoke” 
model often chosen by international buyers (Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2014). 
The subcontracting model has made monitoring of human rights in RMG factories difficult 
and further compounded by unauthorised subcontracting licences issued by BGMEA 
(Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly, 2014). Such practices make it difficult for third-party 
compliance auditors, employed by some retailers and brands with strong policies against 
subcontracting, to detect the presence of subcontractors. Recent, high-profile incidents 
relating to working conditions have given rise to serious questions regarding the ability and 
willingness of BGMEA and the government to ensure the human rights of workers in this 
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sector. The next section briefly presents descriptive accounts of human rights disasters in the 
RMG sector, and the responses of the state and businesses. 
Human rights disasters in RMG 
On 24 April 2013, an eight-storey building collapsed in a suburb of the capital city of 
Bangladesh. The building, named Rana Plaza, housed a number of RMG factories employing 
around 5,000 workers. In this catastrophic accident, at least 1,080 workers died and 2,500 
workers were severely injured. The day before the building collapse, a TV channel recorded 
footage showing cracks in the Rana Plaza building. The shops and a bank operating on the 
lower floors of the building were immediately closed. RMG workers were forced to enter the 
building to work, even though the management (RMG owners) were fully aware that the 
building had cracks and that other offices were closed. The probe report claimed that they 
were seeking to meet the deadlines set by buyers. Although the Rana Plaza disaster may have 
been the most publicised event, it is certainly not the only one, as RMG factories have been 
susceptible to incidences of workplace safety. On 24 November 2012, a deadly fire broke out 
in Tazreen Fashions, an RMG unit producing apparel for leading manufacturers such as 
Walmart and C&A. At least 112 people were confirmed dead in the fire, and at least 200 
were injured, making it the deadliest factory fire in the nation’s history (The New York 
Times, 2012b). Prior to Tazreen, 29 workers had died in the Hameem factory fire in 2010. 
The government has been accused of criminal negligence with regard to the Tazreen fire, 
having turned a blind eye to the illegal erection of additional floors in the building 
(Kernaghan, 2012). In the case of Rana Plaza, various government authorities not only failed 
to inspect and monitor its illegal establishment, but the government also failed to act even 
after the cracks in the building had been broadcast by local media the day before the collapse 
(Gomes, 2013). After the Rana Plaza incident, the Bangladesh government came under 
pressure from international agencies such as the ILO, HRW and Western countries, including 
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the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, global manufacturers who, in 
response to severe media criticism, promised to review their decision to use Bangladesh as a 
supply chain, have continued their operations in the country. This is predominantly due to 
Bangladesh’s ability to provide the cheapest quote for RMG products. 
6. State’s “denial” strategy and human rights disasters 
Before examining the official denial of responsibility for the above human rights disasters, it 
is important to set the context by elaborating on the Bangladeshi state’s general response to 
allegations such as lack of transparency and accountability, and corruption. Bangladesh has 
consistently been ranked as one of the top ten countries in the world corruption index 
prepared by TI. TIB prepares reports and publicises the findings of TI to highlight particular 
sectors or ministries. It is quite common to see ministers, concerned individuals or state 
ministries lashing out against these reports and comments, often using an implicatory or 
counter-offensive strategy: 
We outright reject the report as it is false, baseless, confusing and politically 
motivated to malign the government as well as the country abroad … we hope that the 
TIB will withdraw its report immediately (Local Government and Rural Development 
Minister, BDNews24.com, 2006). 
Adopting a typical “condemning the condemner” (Cohen, 1993) technique or an implicatory 
denial strategy, the above minister also deliberately questioned the moral standing of the 
chairperson of TIB: 
He himself a corrupt person – how does he find out the corruption of others? Such a 
person like [the TIB chairperson] has no moral right to brand the country as a 
corrupt one … he simply wanted to tarnish the image of the government and the 
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country as well (Local Government and Rural Development Minister, 
BDNews24.com, 2006). 
In 2012, the World Bank cancelled a US $1.2 billion credit to Bangladesh to build a bridge 
over the river Padma following allegations of rampant corruption involving a number of 
senior ministers of the Bangladeshi government. The Prime Minister’s reaction was to adopt 
a counter-offensive strategy, questioning the political motive of the World Bank: 
They want us to beg. They want us to continue as guinea pigs (Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh, The Guardian, 2012). 
TIB labelled the Prime Minister’s reaction a “denial syndrome” (TIB, 2012). The finance 
minister of Bangladesh also called the integrity department of the World Bank, which 
initiated the corruption charges, a “highly inefficient body that should not exist” (The 
Financial Express, 2013b). Such discourse of denial is consistent with Cohen’s depiction of a 
counter-offensive strategy in which, in the case of an undeniable allegation, efforts are made 
to discredit the international source (Cohen, 2001, p.113). The government’s tendency to 
apply a discourse of denial to human rights issues was highlighted in the country report of the 
AHRC (2013). 
As Cohen has pointed out, the state may adopt various strategies of denial. A counter-
offensive strategy tends to be chosen by the state when strong material evidence is absent or 
is not widely seen by the public, or when the attacker has a weak power base. In the face of 
the above allegations, the Bangladesh government found it much easier to attack TIB by 
suggesting that the allegations were lies, propaganda and ideologically driven. 
However, a different strategy has been adopted in the case of serious human rights disasters, 
when, given the evidence, the government was unable to adopt a “counter attack strategy” so 
employed another variant of official denial – “interpretive denial”. Immediately after the 
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Tazreen fire incident, the Prime Minister referred to it as “an act of sabotage” (Reuters, 
2012). Also, after the Rana Plaza incident, a senior minister in the cabinet attempted to blame 
the opposition party for the building collapse: 
The fundamentalist BNP [the party in opposition] had called the shutdown. I was told 
some hired supporters went there and shook the gates … and the pillars. This might 
be the reason behind the collapse ... When part of a building caves in, it affects the 
whole. This might have happened (The Huffington Post, 2013). 
The above quotations resonate with a classic interpretive denial strategy. It was almost 
impossible for the state to offer a literal denial, given the material evidence and the presence 
of national and international media. Despite having to acknowledge that something wrong 
had happened, it was more effective for the government to try to neutralise the impact of the 
event by denying responsibility and blaming somebody else. As Cohen (2001, p.108) puts it: 
“Yes, something bad happened, but don’t blame us. Responsibility lies with shadowy army 
groups, vigilantes, rogue psychopaths, proxy armies, vague third forces … or ‘unknown 
elements’.” 
The government’s persistent strategy of using interpretive denial has allowed the regulatory 
body, BGMEA to adopt a similar strategy. After the Tazreen fire, BGMEA followed the lead 
of the government in blaming unknown “conspirators”: 
By analysing the evidence, considering the accounts of interviews of the eyewitnesses 
we have got indications that the fire was planned. The whole incident should be 
probed further and the conspirators should be brought to justice (BGMEA President, 
The Independent, 2013) 
Similar statements had been used by BGMEA in response to prior allegations of human rights 
violations. For example, when 29 workers died in the Hameem factory fire in 2010, 
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Hameem’s owner, also then president of the Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries (FBCCI), a forum for business owners, claimed that the fire was a 
result of “sabotage” (Gomes, 2013). After the Rana Plaza collapse, the US government 
suspended its generalised system of preference (GSP) facility, which allows duty-free access 
of some products from specific countries to the US market. BGMEA blamed local civil 
society groups and labour unions for tarnishing the image of the country, and threatened legal 
action against them on charges of sedition – a classic case of implicatory denial. BGMEA 
took a counter offensive strategy, blaming others for being “treacherous, unpatriotic, or 
irresponsible” (Cohen, 2001). 
The various denial strategies adopted by the state and trade associations such as BGMEA can 
be understood from the perspectives of legitimacy and accountability relationships. Black 
(2008) argues that the construction of accountability is contingent on the types of legitimacy 
required by state and non-state actors. Despite winning a disputed election in 2013, the ruling 
party of Bangladesh seems to have cognitive legitimacy, claiming to be the only party of war 
heroes – a claim apparently accepted by a large section of society. Pressure to be accountable 
to the general population is significantly lower given this apparent cognitive legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, moral legitimacy must still be maintained by the government. “Denial of 
responsibility” contributes to maintaining the moral legitimacy that the state seems to seek. 
Identifying the World Bank and other international agencies/countries as imperial monsters is 
a calculative denial strategy taken by successive governments on many occasions (The 
Guardian, 2012; BDNews24.com, 2006). Black (2008) argues that accountability is one form 
of constructing and presenting a narrative of past events or actions: denial of responsibility 
not only allows the state to create a narrative to suppress anti-narratives, but also enhances its 
moral legitimacy. Similarly, denial of responsibility by trade associations such as BGMEA is 
closely connected with pragmatic legitimacy, as such organisations are bound to protect 
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RMG owners’ interests, being accountable to their members. Drawing on political 
connections with the state, BGMEA even sought moral legitimacy in adopting “interpretive 
denial” strategies. Similar legitimacy claims will also be seen in the following two human 
rights issues discussed below. 
Human rights issues: Collective bargaining and working conditions 
Drawing on the MAC events, interviews and documentary evidence, this paper addresses two 
specific human rights issues: the presence of collective bargaining agents (trade unions); and 
working conditions, including forced and compulsory labour, complaints and grievance 
procedures, and occupational health and safety. 
Collective bargaining 
The presence of trade unions has been a contentious issue for the RMG sector in Bangladesh. 
Historically, RMG owners have been reluctant to allow the formation of trade unions. The 
Bangladesh Independent Garments Workers Union, founded in 1995, was refused registration 
as a national union, mainly due to objections raised by owners of RMG industries (ILO, 
1995). According to national legislation, the owners’ permission was required for the 
establishment of a trade union in an enterprise belonging to the RMG sector. RMG owners 
had long exercised this discretion, not only by disallowing the formation of trade unions, but 
also by thwarting any attempt to form a trade union through severe repression, dismissal, and 
assault by hooligans hired by RMG owners. HRW lobbied successive prime ministers of 
Bangladesh to stop harassment of trade union organisers in the RMG sector. 
Repression of trade unions has often resulted in the disappearance or even death of their 
leaders. For instance, in a letter to the current prime minister, HRW cited one union leader 
who was detained by national security intelligence as he was trying to negotiate a national 
minimum wage for workers in the garment sector. He was later found dead. In a letter dated 
11 April 2012, HRW urged the government to “immediately launch a comprehensive and 
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impartial investigation of the disappearance, torture, and murder of [the union leader], and 
publicly report the findings” (HRW, 2012). In an interview with CNN, the Prime Minister 
expressed surprise and commented: 
Which union does he belong to? What is the name of the union, do you know that? 
Nobody knew that he was a labour leader. He was killed somehow … it was our 
police that recovered his dead body (Bangladesh Prime Minister, Interview with 
CNN, 2013). 
Given international pressure on the government following the Rana Plaza disaster, collective 
bargaining was allowed to be established without the permission of the owners (Sohel, 2013), 
with the exception of RMG units operating in special economic zones. However, a survey 
conducted by HRW in 2014 found that, in many garment factories, owners still continued to 
threaten workers who wanted to form or join trade unions (The Daily Star, 2014a). On 24 
April 2014, on the first anniversary of the Rana Plaza collapse, the chairman of the United 
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed his concerns over BGMEA’s role in 
the suppression of trade union activities in the RMG sector in Bangladesh: 
Many factory owners in Bangladesh have suppressed the formation of unions in their 
factories by firing union leaders and, according to reports, some factory managers 
have been involved in vicious attacks on union organizers. The industry association 
for Bangladesh’s garment factory owners, the BGMEA, continues to represent the old 
guard of factory owners and has been reluctant to take any action against its 
members who engage in anti-union activity. The government of Bangladesh, while 
making progress in the registration of new unions, still lacks the institutional capacity 
and political will to protect them (Sharon, 2014). 
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In his response to this statement, the BGMEA president denied the allegations, claiming that 
a record number of trade unions had been formed after the Rana Plaza incident and that more 
would be established in the coming years (The Bangladesh Today, April 26, 2014). However, 
during the MAC meeting, a representative from an organisation for workers’ rights voiced 
her concern over the formation of a “record number of trade unions” in recent months. This 
suggests that RMG owners are actively involved in creating pro-owner trade unions, mainly 
to combat workers’ resistance: 
In 2012, there were just 10 trade unions, and yet, now [in 2013/14] the number has 
risen to more than 100. Why this sudden rise? We hear that workers are being paid in 
some RMG units to join “pro-owner” trade unions – you can clearly understand how 
effective these trade unions are going to be in protecting workers’ rights. In other 
RMG units, workers are being threatened not to join trade unions, unless these are 
pro-owner unions – this is just a mockery of the entire process (MAC participant 21: 
Project manager, Uttaran, a social development organisation). 
This was supported by Brad Adams, executive director of HRW’s Asia chapter, who, in a 
recent interview, blamed the state-business nexus for the state’s failure to protect human 
rights abuses in the RMG sector in Bangladesh: 
There are also serious labour problems [in Bangladesh]. For instance, workers are 
being attacked for trying to form associations to protect their rights. These attacks are 
perpetrated by garment manufacturers and are supported by government officials. 
Many members of the government own factories and there is a lot of political pressure 
on the people who are trying to organize trade unions (DW, 2014). 
The discourse used by the Bangladesh government was much more serious, and resembled a 
counter-offensive strategy of denial. Defending BGMEA’s stance on trade unions, a senior 
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government minister questioned the moral standing of the US government with regard to 
trade unions: 
Even though there has been no trade union in the US so far, they are forcing us to 
allow trade unions in Bangladesh (Dhaka Tribune, 2014c). 
State politics influence trade unionism in Bangladesh (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). This 
influence is drawn mainly from the political affiliations of trade union leaders (Belal and 
Owen, 2007). In the MAC events, the problem of politicisation of trade unions was posited as 
the major reason for the RMG sector’s reluctance to allow trade unions in the factory: 
Trade unions to me is fine. You have to let people speak. However, they should be 
able to speak for workers’ rights, rather than acting as a party leader of the Awami 
League and the BNP [the two major political parties in Bangladesh]. Most members of 
parliament own a garments factory, and would want to use their employees as 
potential vote banks for national elections. How can you avoid political influence 
then? (MAC participant 26: Managing director and owner of an RMG unit) 
Another respondent said: “Workers go for political vandalism, not trade unionism” (MAC 
participant 22: Managing director and owner of an RMG unit). 
To avoid the formation of trade unions, RMG owners often form a participation committee, 
as reflected during debates in the meeting. The president of the Garments Workers Union, a 
high-profile female activist with years of experience working in RMG factories in 
Bangladesh, observed: 
Trade unions are always seen as threats by the owners. The government also keeps 
silent about this issue as they do not want to harm the politician-businessmen. Also, 
we need trade union leaders who would speak out for the workers, rather than being 
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puppets of the owners (MAC participant 07: President, Sommilito Garment Sromik 
Federation, the apex body for RMG workers’ unions). 
Although some participants in the MAC event supported the idea of allowing trade unions in 
the RMG sector, many seemed content with the current position of the government and the 
BGMEA, despite being informed of the repression of unionists. Key stakeholders seem to 
believe that the trade association, BGMEA, continues to block the formation of trade unions 
in the RMG sector, even though this is now considered illegal. The common counter-
allegations made by BGMEA and RMG owners are that trade unions are not true 
representatives of workers or are highly politicised. From the legitimacy point of view, 
BGMEA is clearly protecting its members’ interests and constructing narratives against 
collective bargaining for its members. The state’s narratives favour RMG owners, branding 
the USA’s actions as imperial activity. The state’s legitimacy is not under threat cognitively 
or normatively/morally, given that, for various historical reasons, mainstream narratives of 
trade union activity are negative (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). The state’s silence or support for 
RMG owners on trade union issues can be further understood in light of the culture of the 
politician-businessman emerging in Bangladesh. This gives owners far more material 
advantages over their competitors, including evading human rights regulations that are 
supposed to be protected by the state. 
Working conditions 
Long working hours, low wages, poor workers’ rights, gender discrimination and very unsafe 
workplaces in the RMG sector have been reported by many commentators and researchers 
(Kumar, 2006). Accidents such as the Rana Plaza disaster were simply waiting to happen. On 
the day of the collapse, as many of the workers were worried about the safety of the building, 
some managers threatened to withhold a month’s pay from those who refused to come to 
work (The Huffington Post, 2013). Recruitment policies are highly informal, with no formal 
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contracts (Bansari, 2010), which enabled the managers of RMG factories within the Rana 
Plaza to threaten the workers with pay cuts. Violation of international labour standards and 
codes of conduct is common in RMG units (Dasgupta, 2002). The remainder of this section 
discusses these issues in relation to the UN principles. 
Workplace safety became a critical concern after the Rana Plaza disaster. The Bangladeshi 
government, RMG owners and BGMEA all faced public outcry. The Rana Plaza collapse was 
inextricably linked with questions about the state’s ability and willingness to protect workers. 
The building itself had been illegally erected in the first place, on land grabbed from its 
previous owners, and additional floors had then been added without proper planning 
permission. The local authority was unable or unwilling to act, as media reports clearly 
indicated that the owner was a senior joint convenor of the ruling party. However, 
immediately after the collapse, the government denied any political connection with the 
owner. 
The Rana Plaza disaster perhaps raised questions about the state’s moral legitimacy. Drawing 
on various literatures on legitimacy, Black (2008) associates four types of claim with 
moral/normative legitimacy: constitutional, justice, functional and democratic claims. The 
magnitude of these human disasters haunted the state still further when the media reported 
that the owner of the building was a ruling party member. Immediate and literal denial was 
necessary for the government to manipulate the narratives around these issues. Constitutional 
and justice claims were necessary for the state to maintain moral legitimacy. One action taken 
by the state was the immediate arrest of the building and factory owners. Nevertheless, 
narratives were maintained to blame others or vested parties for causing the incidents – a 
form of interpretive denial. 
Under pressure from global retailers, the ILO and wider stakeholders, in 2013 a national 
tripartite plan on fire safety was agreed between the government of Bangladesh, RMG 
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owners and workers. The ILO acted as a catalyst and aided the formulation of this plan. Key 
activities identified in the plan included the assessment of the structural integrity and fire 
safety of RMG factory buildings and a strengthening of labour inspection in RMG factories. 
Implementation of these regulations is more challenging than formulation of the rules. As we 
have argued, the state’s willingness to protect workers is questionable, to say the least, 
reflected in their denial strategy, and in the legitimacy and accountability conditions of the 
family-led governments. A recent report published by ACCORD (an independent fire 
inspection and building safety body) shows that 1,289 factories out of 1,677 have been 
inspected. Most need corrective action and the owners are behind schedule in taking these 
actions. ACCORD’s most recently quarterly report, published in November 2015, 
commented: “ACCORD remains concerned about the delays in remediation in many 
inspected factories. More than a thousand factories are behind schedule with remediation” 
(p.1). 
The national tripartite plan did not address other working conditions, such as long working 
hours and low wages. There had been considerable workers’ resistance around these issues a 
few months after the Rana Plaza incident. In November 2013, following a four-day shutdown 
of hundreds of factories by strikes and a series of violent confrontations involving tens of 
thousands of people, Bangladeshi RMG workers eventually forced the owners to agree to a 
77 per cent rise in the minimum wage. Nevertheless, despite the rise, the minimum wage rate 
remains the lowest in the world. However, it was pointed out that the salary increment was 
given mostly as part of the bonus structure, and the basic hourly wage of the workers had 
only been increased by 15 per cent. This means that the pay rise will have limited impact on 
overtime payments to workers (based on hourly rates), which constitute the largest 
component of workers’ take-home pay. Thus, concerns around long working hours and low 
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wages remain strong among workers and trade unions. This has been reflected in small-scale 
eruptions of violent demonstrations and lock-downs in RMG factories. 
In general, BGMEA has refused pay rises to workers, claiming that such wage increases 
would make Bangladesh less competitive in international RMG markets (Ethirajan, 2012). 
Worker’s representatives have fiercely contradicted the claims and commented: 
If your owner ditches a few of his BMWs and reduces the number of holidays he goes 
to, I’m sure he can well afford a pay rise without harming market competitiveness 
(MAC participant 29: General Secretary, Union for Garments Workers). 
RMG owners and BGMEA believe, as reflected in the meeting, that wages are reasonably 
fair. When asked whether it was possible to live decently on the wage structure being offered 
to RMG workers, a manager of an apparel company replied: 
In Bangladesh, women who possess no skill come to Dhaka from the villages, as they 
hear about the employment opportunities in the garment sector. After they hang 
around near the gates of some garments factories for a couple of weeks, they usually 
get a job through an informal contract. You tell me, what wages can we offer to this 
unskilled worker? Shouldn’t she be happy that she has at least found a job? (MAC 
participant 14: Manager of an RMG unit) 
Unsurprisingly, both the government and BGMEA have pursued a consistent discourse of 
denial (literal denial) in response to allegations regarding the working conditions of RMG 
workers. In line with the denial of responsibility strategy, BGMEA has typically accused 
“vested quarters” (counter-offensive strategies) of creating anarchy in the RMG sector. The 
BGMEA president issued the following statement: 
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Many factories in Ashulia, Savar and Gazipur remained closed today (Tuesday) and a 
vested group is instigating the workers for creating unrest (The Financial Express, 
2013a). 
In a recent statement, the BGMEA president also accused national and international NGOs 
and labour organisations of conspiring to destroy the RMG sector in Bangladesh (Dhaka 
Tribune, 2014a). This is similar to the government’s stance on agitations by RMG sector 
workers on the issue of working conditions. In a statement, the special assistant to the Prime 
Minister threatened that “anyone spreading propagandas against the country’s garment 
sector” would be “brought to book” (Dhaka Tribune, 2014a). A senior government minister 
also questioned the political bias of the US government in its decision to stop market access 
facilities to Bangladesh on the grounds of its failure to ensure proper working conditions for 
RMG workers (Dhaka Tribune, 2014b). 
The state’s unwillingness to engage with issues around working conditions, offering literal 
official denial and not strictly enforcing regulations, might be better understood from the 
perspective of legitimacy and accountability relationships. The ruling party saw these 
workers’ disturbances as threats, not only to moral and pragmatic legitimacy but perhaps 
even to cognitive legitimacy. The state would be seen as a failed state if it were unable to 
control a mob (workers’ resistance). Thus, counter-offensive narratives were essential (i.e. 
bringing criminals to book). This strong negative influence of the state on working conditions 
in the RMG sector strengthened BGMEA and its members’ positions on the issues. This was 
reflected in the MAC meetings, as observed by the first author. 
The above discussions on working conditions and collective bargaining have indicated the 
shared position held by the state and business. The Bangladesh government’s indifferent 
attitude towards trade unions in the RMG sector, its heavy-handed response to workers’ 
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resistance and its denial of responsibility for human rights abuses do not bode well for the 
implementation of the UN principles. The government’s approach to human rights issues in 
general was best summarised in a comment by a member of Bangladesh’s high-profile 
Human Rights Commission, indicating the overall accountability and transparency of the 
country: 
As I was coming to this event, I heard that this morning a convicted criminal was 
pardoned by the President due to his political affiliation. It is frustrating to work in 
such an environment – it is very difficult to accept unacceptable behaviour from those 
in the government – there does not seem to be any mechanism to hold the politicians 
accountable for violation of human rights (MAC participant 09: Commissioner, 
Human Rights Commission, Bangladesh). 
Interestingly, the UN (2011) proposes a more proactive role for national human rights 
institutions in the proper implementation of the guiding principles. However, the above 
comment from a person who actually sits on the board of the Human Rights Commission in 
Bangladesh indicates the apparent helplessness of the body, and casts serious doubts on its 
role in implementing the UN (2011) principles in Bangladesh. At the end of the second MAC 
meeting, the overall atmosphere of the room was of helplessness and despair. It appeared that 
there was consensus in the room that the socio-political environment in Bangladesh acts as a 
major impediment to effective implementation of the UN (2011) guiding principles. When 
asked to comment on possible solutions, the President of the RMG Workers’ Union urged 
more intervention from multilateral agencies: 
Do you think companies such as Primark and Walmart have agreed to pay 
compensation to the Rana Plaza victims for nothing? They were actually forced to 
pay, either by their governments, or by influential stakeholder groups. Unfortunately, 
32 
in Bangladesh, this will not happen. Here, the government is business, and the 
business is government [referring to the state-business nexus]. However, I urge the 
members of the donor agencies present in this room to put pressure on the 
government so that workers’ rights can be ensured. They will listen to you only. This 
is the sad reality of Bangladesh (MAC participant 07: President, Sommilito Garment 
Sromik Federation, the apex body for RMG workers’ unions). 
Most participants in the MAC meetings, including government representatives (professional 
bureaucrats, rather than politicians) agreed with this statement! However, participants from 
various donor agencies present in the meeting refused to comment on this issue, perhaps to 
avoid political and diplomatic hazards. It is clear from the above comments that the state is 
unwilling to make real changes in the sector. Marginal changes have been made only to 
satisfy international stakeholders’ seasonal pressures. Pressure from Western retailers to 
make cheaper products with tight deadlines continues. Enforcement of regulations remains 
far-fetched in the context of family-led state politics (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper has explored the state-business nexus in responses to human rights disasters in 
Bangladesh and its implications for the efficacy of the UN guiding principles. The paper has 
drawn on Cohen’s notion of denial and Black’s legitimacy and accountability relationships of 
state and non-state actors to understand the responses of the state and businesses to human 
rights disasters. 
The paper makes a number of empirical and theoretical claims. First, there is clear evidence 
of the state-business nexus perpetuating human rights disasters, in line with the existing but 
scant literature (Sikka, 2011). Previous studies have focused only on multinational companies 
and states’ apparent inability to put a stop to potential human rights abuses. In line with 
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studies in law and criminology, we report that the state itself is allegedly involved in human 
rights abuses. As we have demonstrated, this nature of the state creates the necessary 
conditions for businesses to disregard human rights in businesses, including RMG. Our study 
also shows that the Bangladeshi state, ruled by family-led political parties, is more inclined to 
protect businesses that cause human rights disasters, rather than to ensure human rights in 
businesses. 
Second, the paper finds that the institutional field sets the background for continued human 
rights abuses in the RMG sector. Economic conditions in Bangladesh contribute to this, 
perpetuated by Western businesses’ insatiable desire for cheaper products. Relying on 
cheaper labour, the RMG sector is responsible for bringing precious foreign currency into the 
country, resulting in extra protection being provided by the state. This gives almost free 
licence to exploit and abuse human rights in the sector, as some interviewees and participants 
argued. Political conditions also enable RMG owners to continue to violate safety and 
security in the workplace and maintain inhumane working conditions. Being close to the 
family-led political parties proves beneficial, resulting in lax controls and weak enforcement 
of existing human rights regulations. 
Third, the paper argues that the UN guiding principles are inadequate. Following the high-
profile Rana Plaza collapse, a number of major global garments retailers were under intense 
media scrutiny for their failure to ensure human rights for workers in supply chains located in 
poorer countries. The US, EU and donor agencies working in Bangladesh appear to have 
taken action to ensure that adequate steps were taken to address human rights concerns. 
Subsequently, changes were made in some aspects, including several provisions on 
workplace safety, and acknowledgement of freedom of association as a workers’ right in the 
RMG sector. Interestingly, even these marginal changes do not apply to RMG in export 
processing zones. Overall, the changes have been insufficient and have fallen short of 
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international labour standards (ILO, 2013). We have found that the government has been very 
slow to inspect workplace safety. The dim view taken by the government of workers’ claims 
for fair wages and better working conditions is alarming. Trade unionism faces completely 
different operational challenges. RMG owners apply tactics such as creating a puppet trade 
union, harassing workers who join the trade union and constructing narratives of 
politicisation of trade unionism. The inadequacy of the UN guidelines can be further 
understood in light of our theoretical claims. 
Theoretically, the paper provides explanations of how the state-business nexus responds to 
human rights disasters. The fundamental position of this network is “denial of responsibility” 
for human rights violations in the RMG sector. This rhetoric of denial has consistently been 
applied by the highest level of the state, including the Prime Minister, and ministers have 
often adopted a counter-offensive strategy to vilify internal and external critics of human 
rights issues. The persistent use of such rhetoric by politicians and the state has allowed trade 
associations such as BGMEA to adopt similar denial strategies in responding to important 
human rights violations. 
The denial strategies adopted have ranged from “literal denial” to “interpretive denial” to 
“counter-offensive strategies” (attacking the critique) and “implicatory denial”, depending on 
the circumstances and issues in question. Denying responsibility has material advantage for 
both the state and trade associations. The state seeks to protect the image of the RMG sector 
so that it can continue to reap economic benefits. Yet, how do state or non-state actors 
continue to deny responsibility in the context of catastrophic human rights disasters? This 
needs to be understood in terms of the legitimacy and accountability relationships that these 
bodies seek to construct (Black, 2008). We have argued in this paper that the ruling party of 
the Bangladeshi government has deployed official denial as a strategic device to enhance 
legitimacy and accountability relationships. A counter-offensive strategy in response to any 
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disaster (human rights or otherwise) is critical for establishing moral legitimacy and 
maintaining the cognitive legitimacy that the ruling party seems to enjoy among the wider 
population. We found that constructing narratives using various denial strategies – 
implicating vested quarters or international conspiracy – is a form of accountability 
mechanism successfully employed by both the Bangladeshi government and BGMEA in 
responding to human rights disasters. 
The apparently successful deployment of denial strategies has serious implications for 
implementation of the UN guiding principles. Denial of, or constructing narratives against, 
the responsibility of both key players – the state and business – is a major stumbling block to 
bringing about any changes or conforming to existing regulations. We found that there have 
been allegations that the Bangladeshi state has committed human rights abuses against its 
own citizens, so it is unsurprising that it is not proactive against human rights abuses in 
businesses. Key participants’ exasperated comments indicated that, as long as the state is 
unable to acknowledge that issues such as working conditions and collective bargaining are 
fundamental human rights, the UN guiding principles will have little impact. Complex state 
politics – family, kinship and wealthy supporters – will continue to shape the state’s ability to 
influence the human rights practices of business. The regulatory framework, albeit far from 
the international labour standard, will remain symbolic and inadequate, as just another 
regulatory framework imposed on poorer countries (Siddiqui, 2010). Recent studies have 
suggested empowering trade unions (Belal and Owen, 2007) and greater activism by civil 
societies as potential remedies (Belal, 2015). We remain pessimistic. Fundamental changes in 
local politics and international economics appear to be necessary to bring about the real 
changes badly needed in human rights practices in businesses. 
Finally, this paper calls for further research in a number of areas. First, further exploration is 
necessary of important human rights issues in business, such as child labour and gender 
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discrimination, which are often attributed to the supply chain companies of large 
multinationals. Second, the social auditing employed by multinational companies to check on 
subcontracting factories needs intensive study. For instance, factories in Rana Plaza were 
given the green light in relation to workplace safety just before the collapse. Third, further 
intensive research is critical to scrutinise compliance with human rights guidelines, not only 
in the RMG sector but also in other supply chain companies, especially in politically unstable 
countries (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). 
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1 The six garment factories in Rana Plaza were all operating under treacherous working conditions to meet 
export deadlines set by global apparel giants. 
2 Freud originally distinguished between “repression”, which applies to defences against internal instinctual 
demands, and “denial” (or what he called “disavowal”), which applies to defences against the claims of external 
reality. 
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3 “Official denial” is collective, and sometimes highly organised. Cohen (1993) observes that, in some cases, 
such denials are actively supported and sustained by significant state resources. In totalitarian societies, the 
extreme form of such collective denial may involve a complete rewriting of history. In such cases, denial is not 
an individual or personal matter. Rather, it is embedded in the ideological disguise of the state. The third form of 
denial, cultural denial, is not individualistic, and is not necessarily complemented by state mechanisms. Under 
this form, the entire society moves into a collective mode of denial, in which different types of atrocities and 
human rights violations are known, but never openly acknowledged. Although such denials may sometimes be 
initiated by the state, these are sustained by the cultural norms of the society. 
4 For the sake of anonymity, the names of the organisers of this event are not disclosed in this paper. 
